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One prom ising way to investigate the genealogy o f  norm s is by considering not the 
origin o f  norm s, but ra ther w hat m akes certain norm s m ore likely to prevail. E m otional 
responses, I m aintain, constitu te one im portan t set o f m echanism s th a t affects the cul­
tural viability o f  norm s. T o  co rroborate  this, I exploit historical evidence indicating 
that sixteenth-century etiquette norm s prohibiting disgusting actions were m uch more 
likely to survive than o ther sixteenth-century etiquette norm s. This case suggests m ore 
broadly  th a t research on  cultural evolution should pay greater atten tion  to  the role o f 
em otion systems in cultural transm ission.
1. Introduction. Norms, the rules that tell us how we ought to behave, form 
a central part of our everyday lives. Some of these norms, the moral norms, 
have been a central concern in several different fields in the history of 
thought, including philosophy, psychology, evolutionary biology, and an­
thropology. But where do our moral norms come from? Why do we have 
the norms we do? According to one prominent naturalistic proposal, “evo­
lutionary ethics,” moral norms are evolutionary adaptations (e.g., Ruse 
and Wilson 1986). Although there has been a great deal of interest in 
evolutionary ethics among philosophers of science, there is widespread 
skepticism about such evolutionary explanations of why we have the 
moral norms we do. Indeed, even those who are attracted to an evolu­
tionary explanation o f basic mental capacities often remain dubious of
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evolutionary explanations of specific norms (e.g., Ayala i 987, 1995, 
Kitcher 1990, 1994).' In this paper, I will develop an alternative natural­
istic approach to explaining the genealogy of norms that does not assume 
that the moral norms are themselves adaptations.
Genealogical approaches have important philosophical precedents of 
course (e.g., Nietzsche and Rousseau), but I’ll advance a genealogical ac­
count that owes more to cognitive anthropology than to the canon of 
Western philosophy. In recent cognitive anthropology, the epidemiological 
account offers a promising approach to cultural evolution (e.g., Sperber 
1996, Boyer 2000). On this account, one investigates cultural evolution by 
considering not the origin of cultural items, but rather, what makes certain 
cultural items more likely to prevail; furthermore, the epidemiological ap­
proach maintains that the characteristics of human psychology will play 
an enormous role in determining which items are likely to survive. After 
sketching the epidemiological approach, I will proceed first by arguing 
that existing work on affect suggests that epidemiological approaches 
should recognize affective systems as important factors in determining 
which cultural items get preserved. I maintain that emotional responses 
will affect the cultural viability of norms as well as other cultural items. 
In particular, norms prohibiting actions that elicit negative affect will, I 
argue, be more likely to survive than affectively neutral norms. I will then 
Consider some historical evidence on the development of manners in our 
culture, and I’ll argue that the historical evidence supports the hypothesis 
that norms prohibiting emotionally upsetting actions are more likely to 
survive. The role of emotion in the cultural survival of norms might also, 
I suggest, shed light on why some central moral norms have prevailed. 
The result is that we have a fragment of the genealogy of norms which 
does not depend on the assumption that the norms themselves are adap­
tations. In addition, as I’ll discuss in the final section, the theoretical and 
historical considerations brought to bear in the case of norms suggest that 
current scientific approaches to cultural evolution need to accord greater 
attention to the role of emotion. Indeed, although the paper will focus 
largely on etiquette norms, this case suggests more broadly that emotion 
is a powerful force in affecting which mental representations get preserved 
in a culture.
2. Origin Stories. Most genealogical accounts of norms focus on moral 
norms, and the most familiar attempts to explain the genealogy of morals 
strive to give an account of the origin of moral norms in our cultural past. 
The problem with such origin explanations is not that we don’t have any
I. D arw in him self expresses skepticism abou t the view th a t m oral norm s are ad ap ta ­
tions (D arw in 1871, ch ap ter 4).
good explanations, but rather that we have too many good explanations, 
and not enough historical evidence to decide between them. This is true 
even if we restrict ourselves to non-adaptationist explanations for the 
emergence o f moral norms in the culture. Here is a quick and incomplete 
catalog of some candidate explanations of the cultural origins of moral 
norms prohibiting harming others.
a. Nietzsche’s “slave morality” : The weak invented the norms as a 
self-serving strategy to protect themselves against harm from the 
powerful (Nietzsche 1887; see Boehm 1999 for a related view).
b. Reciprocal altruism: Individuals agree not to harm each other be­
cause (at least if resources aren’t scarce) this agreement is beneficial 
to both parties (cf. Trivers 1971).
c. Indirect reciprocity: Adopting the norm of not harming others 
might make one more attractive for alliances (cf. Alexander 1987, 
Frank 1988).
d. Kin selection: Adopting the norm not to hurt kin might confer a 
selective advantage, and the norm prohibiting harm might then be 
generalized to the group (cf. Sober and Wilson 1998).
e. Emotional sensitivity: The emotions might play a key role in the 
origination of the norms against harming others. Witnessing the 
suffering of others is emotionally upsetting, and it’s possible that 
the norms against harm arose as a concession to this emotional 
sensitivity.
f. Random mutation: The origin of harm norms might have been an 
arbitrary fluke that was promoted by a dominant individual who 
happened to wield unusually strong influence. One way that this 
might be implemented is if the dominant individual punishes trans­
gressors and punishes those who don’t punish transgressors 
(Axelrod 1986; Boyd and Richerson 1992).
I think that we must frankly acknowledge that all of these stories are 
possible accounts of the origin of norms against harming others in our 
culture. No doubt further possible origin stories could be cooked up. How­
ever, while origin stories have proliferated over the last several decades, 
the crucial historical details that coutd decide between the stories remain 
elusive. To confirm such an origin story, one would want to have a detailed 
record of a culture that lacked harm norms and then developed them. We 
have no such detailed records, which is not surprising since harm norms 
are culturally ubiquitous and historically ancient.
A further problem with the origin stories is that we can’t assume that 
a single origin account applies to all cultures. It might be that harm norms 
originated for one reason in one culture and for another reason in another 
culture. So even if we were presented with the crucial historical details for
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how the harm norms arose for some tribe in the Pleistocene, we could not 
casually generalize this orjgin story to other groups.
Given this problem with the proliferation of origin stories in the absence 
of the relevant historical ejidence, one might become abjectly discouraged 
about the possibility of getting any insight into the actual genealogy of 
these norms. I think that a rather different genealogical goal might offer 
greater promise for success. Instead of seeking an account of the origin of 
moral norms, we might try to determine which features make certain 
norms more likely to prevail than other norms. This might then help us 
explain why harm norms prevailed. To pursue this project, we need to 
turn to cognitive anthropology.
3. Cultural Transmission. Rather than ask for the origin of cultural items 
like norms, one might try to determine which cultural items are more likely 
to survive in a culture. Such “cultural transmission” stories have been 
widely discussed and explored for decades (e.g.. Dawkins 1976, Dennett 
1995). I won’t take the time to review this literature. Rather, I’ll simply 
begin by adopting one of the most promising and interesting recent ap­
proaches to cultural transmission—the epidemiological account intro­
duced by Dan Sperber (1996) and taken up by a few colleagues (e.g., Atran 
1998, Boyer 1994, 1999, 2000).2
The epidemiological approach focuses on a crucial class of cultural 
items—mental representations. Since norms are widely regarded as mental 
representations, this focus will suit us well. According to Sperber, in trying 
to evaluate which cultural items (in the form of mental representations) 
are likely to prevail, one needs to look not only at ecological factors, but 
also at the details of human psychology. In this section and the next, I 
want to present and try to extend the general epidemiological approach 
to cultural transmission. I will eventually bring these points to bear on the 
transmission of norms.
One crucial idea behind jthe epidemiological approach is that if you want 
to understand cultural transmission, it isn’t enough to look at the cultural 
items themselves. You need to look at human psychology, because you need 
to see which cultural items are likely to be attractive to creatures who have 
the kind of psychology that we do. Sperber illustrates this by noting that 
some variants of “ Little Red Riding Hood” are more likely to survive than 
others, because different versions differ in their “attractiveness”:
In the logical space of possible versions of a tale, some versions have 
a better form: that is, a form seen as being without either missing or 
superfluous parts, easier to remember, and more attractive. The fac-
2. F o r a critique o f  rival transipission accounts, see Sperber 1996, chapter 5.
tors that make for a good form may be rooted in part in universal
human psychology and in part in a local cultural context. (Sperber 
1996, 108)
What do we need to know about human psychology to know which 
cultural items will enjoy greater cultural fitness? Sperber is somewhat less 
systematic here than one might like in the progenitor of a new method­
ology. But there are a couple of points on which Sperber is quite clear. 
First, one wants to know which features of human psychology are uni­
versal. Sperber adopts the view, now prominent in evolutionary psychol­
ogy, that the mind is composed of a set of modules that are adaptations 
to the environment. So, there is a module for reasoning about physics, a 
module for reasoning about psychology, and so forth. Moreover, these 
modules are species general—every normal member of the species has the 
modules (or will have them if they are allowed to mature). Sperber em­
braces modules as vital forces in cultural transmission: “Mental modules 
. . . are crucial factors in cultural attraction. They tend to fix a lot of 
cultural content in and around the cognitive domain the processing of 
which they specialize in.” (Sperber 1996, 113) Similarly, Pascal Boyer’s 
deployment o f the epidemiological model appeals to species-universal, but 
domain-specific, cognitive mechanisms. Boyer focuses on a particular clus­
ter of domain-specific bodies of information—intuitive physics, intuitive 
biology, and intuitive psychology. Boyer maintains that all of these should 
be considered part of basic “intuitive ontology” (Boyer 1994, 1999, 2000).
To understand which cultural items are likely to survive, then, we need 
to know as much as possible about universal human psychology. The 
species-general mechanisms are likely to affect attraction and shape the 
kind of information that we retain. But this still doesn’t give us much 
guidance about how to measure whether one item is more culturally fit 
than another. How can we test, experimentally, whether a given cultural 
item is more likely to survive? Sperber and Boyer offer few hints here. But 
one experimental approach rises to the top of the list for both: cultural 
items are more likely to survive if they are easier to remember. For in­
stance, Sperber writes, “Potentially pertinent psychological factors include 
the ease with which a particular representation can be memorized’’ (Sper­
ber 1996, 84; see also Sperber 1996, 62,73,74-75). Similarly, Boyer focuses 
on differences in whether a representation is likely to be recalled as “one 
aspect that is crucial to differences of cultural survival” (Boyer 2000, 105). 
Indeed, in their work on religious ideas, Boyer and Justin Barrett have 
been investigating whether “counterintuitive” representations (i.e., repre­
sentations that violate some aspect of intuitive ontology) are more likely 
to be remembered than representations that are distinctive but not coun­
terintuitive. They find that counterintuitive representations are more likely
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to be remembered; more importantly for present purposes, this evidence 
on retention is the cenlra|l experimental evidence offered to support the 
claim that counterintuitive representations enjoy greater cultural fitness 
(see Boyer 2000, 105).
I've set out two centra features of the epidemiological approach, and 
both of these features will be important in what follows. First, on the 
epidemiological approach, we need to attend closely to the universal fea­
tures of human psychology. Second, we can expect that cultural items that 
are more easily remembered will have greater cultural fitness.
One further feature of the epidemiological approach worth emphasizing 
is that it is well equipped to deal with the apparently enormous variation 
we find in norms across (fultures. Anthropologists like to regale us with 
stories of the astonishingly exotic norms and practices found in other cul­
tures. For instance, some maintain that there are no norms prohibiting 
harming others in some cultures (e.g., Benedict 1934, Turnbull 1972). Even 
if one regards these claims with skepticism, there seems to be considerable 
variation in the harm norms that are embraced in different cultures. One 
of the best known examples in philosophy comes from the anthropological 
explorations of philosopher Richard Brandt. He found that the Hopi 
thought it was morally permissible for children to capture birds, tie them 
up, and let them starve to death. According to Brandt, the Hopi believed 
that the bird felt pain, but still didn’t regard the treatment as countemor- 
mative (Brandt 1959, 102-103). The history of the Aztecs provides an even 
more disturbing picture. According to de Sahagun’s sixteenth-century ac­
count, the Aztecs ritually (killed and cannibalized huge numbers of slaves 
and prisoners taken in battle, including children. De Sahagun reports that 
the victims were often tortured in unspeakably gruesome ways before they 
were killed, and this was done as part of a public celebration (de Sahagun 
1981). Perhaps the most compelling illustration of differences in harm 
norms comes from the treatment of women in other cultures. Chagnon 
maintains that the Yanomamo routinely beat their wives, often to display 
their fierceness to other men in the group (Chagnon 1992, 17). The Yan­
omamo also try to abduct women when they raid enemy villages. Accord­
ing to Chagnon, “A captured woman is raped by all the men in the raiding 
party and, later, by the men in the village who wish to do so but did not 
participate in the raid. She is then given to one of the men as a wife” 
(Chagnon 1992, 190). Of pourse, in our own culture, we regard it as im­
permissible to torture birds, prisoners, and every other sentient being. We 
also regard rape and abduction as impermissible regardless of whether the 
woman is part of an enemy group. Prima facie, the best explanation of 
this is that not all cultures embrace the same harm norms. There are, of 
course, subtle moves one might make to maintain that the cultures really 
agree about the normative claims and only disagree about the facts. But
the epidemiologist need not resort to subtle moves, since the epidemiolog­
ical approach is entirely consistent with rich normative diversity. The ep­
idemiological approach merely tries to explain which norms, once they 
emerge in a culture, will survive better.
4. Affect and Epidemiology. As Sperber and Boyer develop the epidemio­
logical approach, they recommend that to understand cultural transmis­
sion, we attend to species-general information-based cognitive mecha­
nisms like intuitive physics and intuitive psychology. However, there is a 
quite different class of basic mental mechanisms that are almost certainly 
crucial on an epidemiological approach: emotion systems. Sperber and 
Boyer devote little attention to the role of affective mechanisms as forces 
of cultural attraction. Yet a number of affective mechanisms are regarded 
as universal denizens of human psychology. And the idea that affective 
mechanisms partly determine which cultural items succeed is certainly con­
sistent with the epidemiological approach. I will try to put some detail on 
this suggestion over the next couple of pages.
There is, o f course, a simple commonsense reason why we might expect 
emotion to be a powerful force in cultural transmission. Emotional items 
are typically accorded extra importance. Put crudely, we care more about 
information that is emotionally gripping for us. And it seems likely that 
information that we care more about will be more culturally viable. But 
this commonsense idea needs to be sharpened in the context of the epi­
demiological approach.
In contemporary psychology, emotions provided the battleground for 
one of the most important early debates over human universals. Paul Ek- 
man and his colleagues generated a varied and impressive array of data 
indicating that there is a set of universal “basic emotions” that have a 
cluster of features including the following: automatic appraisal, quick on­
set, involuntary occurrence, distinctive physiology, and distinctive facial 
expression. Further, across cultures, there are common elements in the 
contexts that elicit a basic emotion. Among the emotions that fit all the 
criteria of basic emotions are sadness, anger, fear, and disgust (Ekman
1994). These emotions are taken to be evolutionary adaptations that are 
universally instantiated in the species, although there might be important 
cultural variations in some of the eliciting conditions and some of the ways 
the emotions are displayed (see e.g., Mallon and Stich 2000).
Knowing the character of universal affective systems will presumably 
help us to determine which cultural items will succeed. But we still haven't 
considered how emotions might facilitate cultural transmission. As we saw 
above, one crucial experimental assay for cultural fitness is the retention 
test. Items that are better remembered will have an edge in cultural fitness.
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As it happens, we already have in the coffers of science a heap of evidence 
that affect confers this advantage.
Over the last 40 years, (here has been an impressive experimental tra­
dition tracking the effects of affect on memory. The broad pattern of 
findings indicates that increased emotion at encoding facilitates retention 
(for reviews, see Heuer and Reisberg 1992 and Revelle and Loftus 1992), 
This pattern is what matters particularly for us, since we want to see 
whether affect will facilitate cultural survival. However, some of the details 
of this research are worth examining a bit more closely.
One interesting fact is that emotion facilitates long-term retention much 
better than it does short-term retrieval. In one famous series of studies on 
word recall, subjects were shown affectively neutral and affectively 
charged words (e.g., “rape|’). Subjects exhibited worse recall for the emo­
tion words when asked 2 minutes after being given the word lists. How­
ever, when the same subjects were tested for recall a week later, they re­
called the emotion words better than the neutral words (Kleinsmith and 
Kaplan 1963). This finding has been widely replicated, and the broad in­
terpretation of these and related findings is that emotional arousal im­
proves memory, so long a!s memory is not tested shortly after encoding 
(see, e.g., Heuer and Reisberg 1992, 161).
There are two important points about cultural transmission to draw 
from these findings. First, the crucial mnemonic dimension for cultural 
fitness is long-term retention, and that is exactly the dimension that affect 
most clearly facilitates. Second, the retention benefits can’t be attributed 
to a self-serving bias to remember things that are affectively pleasing; for 
the evidence indicates that retention benefits are generated when the stim­
uli elicit negative affect. Ipdeed, most of the experiments showing that 
affect facilitates retention have been done using negative affect. For ex­
ample, in the word recall experiments, the affectively charged words were 
words that generate considerable unease (e.g., “rape” and “vomit”). So, 
stimuli that are emotionally valenced contribute to greater retention even 
though the valence is negative.
Another interesting feature of the work on memory and emotion is that, 
while emotion facilitates memory for the central events in an emotional 
stimulus, emotion also seems to undermine memory for peripheral infor­
mation. In one study, subjects were shown a film in which a teacher and 
a student get into an argument. One group saw a film in which the argu­
ment escalates into an emotional confrontation: the other group saw a 
film in which the argument remained civil. Subjects in both groups re­
membered the central elements of the story well, but subjects in the emo- 
tion-condition had poorer memory for peripheral features of the film (Ke- 
beck and Lohaus 1986). Subjects also apparently show impaired memory 
performance for stimuli presented shortly before or shortly after an emo-
tional stimulus (see e.g., Bower 1994). One explanation of this phenome­
non is that emotional stimuli attract and command attentional resources, 
which are then unavailable for processing peripheral stimuli (Christianson 
1997). Thus, it seems that affect not only facilitates long-term retention, 
affect seems to determine which information gets reliably encoded.
There are several possible mechanisms that might be responsible for 
the effects o f emotion on memory. Emotional events are often more dis­
tinctive than other events, and distinctiveness in general enhances reten­
tion. So one mechanism that plausibly facilitates the retention of emo­
tional stimuli is distinctiveness. However, Christiansen and Loftus (1991) 
pitted distinctiveness against emotion and found that a fairly common 
emotional stimulus (a picture of a woman in an accident) produced better 
retention for central features (e.g., the color of the woman’s coat) than a 
neutral stimulus (a woman riding a bike) and an affectively neutral but 
distinctive stimulus (a woman carrying a bicycle upside-down on her 
shoulder). A rather different explanation for the retention effects is that 
because emotional items have greater salience, they are more frequently 
recalled and rehearsed (Heuer and Reisberg 1992). A related explanation 
is that emotional events get encoded in more elaborate ways since they 
typically have “greater implications for the individual’s sense of self and 
integrity” (Christianson and Engelberg 1999, 222).
Although it is not yet clear which mechanisms underlie the contribution 
affect makes to retention, we don’t need to know this to see that the work 
on the emotions and memory already provides an important tool for ep­
idemiological approaches. For instance, the work suggests that the emo­
tional elements of stories will have greater cultural fitness than the non- 
emotional parts of stories. So, if we could trace transmission of stories in 
an oral tradition (cf. Sperber 1996, 74-75), we should find that the emo­
tional elements of the stories are better preserved across the ages than the 
non-emotional elements. Further, since the psychological evidence indi­
cates that emotional stimuli actually impede retention for peripheral in­
formation, the greater cultural fitness of emotional elements might come 
at the expense of lower cultural fitness for surrounding elements.
So far, I’ve tried to elaborate the epidemiological approach to include 
affective systems as crucial forces in cultural transmission. Affective sys­
tems provide a rich source of likely human universals, and there is con­
siderable evidence that affective systems contribute to greater retention. 
We can combine these two facts to generate a fairly interesting prediction: 
items that are likely to elicit a basic emotion will be more culturally fit 
than items that are affectively neutral. This is significant because insofar 
as there are eliciting conditions for basic emotions that are broadly con­
sistent across cultures, we can expect stimuli that have those features to 
be better remembered and hence have greater cultural fitness.
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5, Affect and the Epidemiology- of Norms. Epidemiological theorists note 
that we need to know features of human psychology to explain cultural 
transmission. This is as true for norms as it is for religious beliefs or sci­
entific beliefs. That is, if you want to understand the cultural transmission 
of norms, the epidemiological approach suggests that you need to know 
some general features of human psychology. In the preceding section, I 
tried to make the case that affect is an important factor in the transmission 
of cultural items, and this v^ ill certainly apply to the transmission of norms. 
Indeed, affect might be especially important to the transmission of norms.
The first thing to note js that the retention benefit afforded by affect 
will apply to norms as it does to other cultural items. Normative claims 
that are “affect-backed,” i.e., that prohibit an action that is emotionally 
upsetting, will be better remembered than non-affect-backed normative 
claims.3 Thus, if more memorable representations have greater cultural 
fitness, then affectively salient norms will plausibly accrue this advantage 
just as much as affectively salient beliefs.
There is reason to think that normative claims would be especially 
strongly influenced by affective systems, since a normative claim would 
plausibly gain strength if, for instance, it prohibited an action that elicits 
negative affect. That is, a ijorm prohibiting an action that is likely to elicit 
negative affect would presumably have enhanced cultural fitness because 
the proscribed action is already regarded as unpleasant. In fact, there is a 
bit of evidence that helps to confirm this claim. In a recent set of experi­
ments, affectively neutral liormative violations (e.g., a dinner guest drinks 
tomato soup out o f a bov^l) were pitted against affectively charged nor­
mative violations (e.g., a djnner guest spits into a water glass before drink­
ing from it) (Nichols forthcoming). Subjects rated the affectively charged, 
“disgust-backed,” violations as much worse than the neutral violations. 
Subjects also were more likely to say that the disgust-backed violations 
would be wrong even if the host had said that it was okay. A follow-up 
experiment compared the responses of low versus high disgust-sensitivity 
subjects. Low-disgust subjects judged a disgusting violation as less serious 
than high-disgust subjects. Low-disgust subjects were also more likely to 
say that the disgusting violation would not be wrong if the host had said 
it was okay. The evidenc^ thus suggests that affect makes a significant 
contribution to the salience of norms. Disgust-backed violations are 
treated as more serious arid authority-independent. And this seems to be 
partly a function o f the lei'el of disgust sensitivity.
3. T he norm s I ’U focus on hefli 
affect-m em ory research has al 
fram e this w ould be to  say t 
cultural fitness. But the termin' 
precise locution.
e are norm s associated with negative em otion, and the 
o focused on negative affect. So, a m ore careful way to 
a l nega/i'vc'-affect-backed norm s will have an edge in 
iplogy is already so aw kw ard that I’ve opted  for th e  less
So affect-backed norms are regarded as more serious and important 
than affectively neutral norms. And the evidence on affect and memory 
suggests that affect-backed norms will be easier to recall than non-affect- 
backed norms. This provides ample reason to expect that affect facilitates 
transmission of norms, and that, in particular, norms prohibiting actions 
likely to elicit negative affect will have enhanced fitness. We might now 
frame this as a hypothesis:
A. Normative prohibitions against action X will be more likely to 
survive if action X elicits (or is easily led to elicit) negative affect.
I t’s important to be clear that the hypothesis is not that only affect-backed 
norms are culturally fit. No doubt societal factors play an enormous role 
in determining which norms survive. My claim is only that by virtue of 
the connection to affect, affect-backed norms have a survival advantage 
over non-affect-backed norms.
6. Norms: An Historical Approach. Although I’ve argued that affect- 
backed norms should have a survival advantage over affectively neutral 
norms, I haven’t actually provided any evidence that helps to confirm that 
affect-backed norms in fact do survive better than affectively neutral 
norms. One might worry that there are lots of other features of normative 
transmission, like the processes that send norms to fixation in an individ­
ual, and these other features might subvert any alleged survival advantage 
for affect-backed norms. So it is important to have some kind of confir­
mation that affect-backed norms have fared better than affectively neutral 
norms. I aim to provide a bit of evidence along these lines in what follows, 
focusing on norms governing manners in our culture.
The hypothesis that I ’ll promote is that affect-backed manners norms 
enjoy greater cultural fitness than affectively neutral manners norms. To 
evaluate this hypothesis, we need first to know what the manners norms 
were-i.e., we need a list of norms from our culture’s past. As these things 
go, we happen to be in a surprisingly good evidentiary situation. The 
closest things we have to primary sources on past norms are etiquette 
manuals, and the history of etiquette manuals in the West is rich and long. 
The genre really began to flourish in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
shortly after the introduction of the printing press. These documents reveal 
the culture’s norms from the perspectives of people within the culture 
itself, rather than through the distorting telescope of historical hindsight. 
There are, of course, lots of problems with using etiquette manuals. To 
list a few of these worries: Are the books really representative of the pre­
vailing norms? To what extent are they written to instill new norms rather 
than reflect prevailing norms? What audience are the books written for? 
Did the authors have other agendas in mind that corrupt their presenta-
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tion? It would be much better to bring sixteenth-century Europeans into 
the lab. Nonetheless, by the standards that apply to historical evidence, 
the etiquette manuals constitute a fantastically rich vein of information. 
We are extremely fortuna;e to have such a detailed historical record in 
our own cultural heritage, and they provide us with the best window on 
past manners we could ho se to have.
The twentieth-century :our guide for European etiquette manuals is 
Norbcrt Elias, whose work. The Civilizing Process provides the best known 
treatment of the materials (Elias [1939] 2000). Perhaps the most celebrated 
feature of Elias’ account is his claim that people’s sense of disgust actually 
becomes more refined as the culture develops a more refined sense of man­
ners. He maintains that with the rise of the modern state, societal pressures 
shaped our emotions, and he uses excerpts from the manners books to 
argue for this thesis. “Images must be placed together in a series to give 
an overall view . . .  of the process: the gradual transformation of behaviour 
and the emotions, the expanding threshold o f repugnance” (Elias [1939] 
2000, 71, emphasis added; see also 98).
Elias builds his case by tracing the prohibitions in manners books from 
the Middle Ages to the present. He considers several different areas, in­
cluding bodily functions, nose blowing, and spitting. The pattern he sets 
out can be elucidated by focusing on any of these domains. I’ve opted for 
spitting. To illustrate the changes in the norms surrounding spitting, Elias 
digs out gems like the following from medieval etiquette verse:
“Do not spit across the table in the manner of hunters.” (130)
“Do not spit into thej basin when you wash your hands, but beside 
it.” (129)
With Erasmus’ etiquette Hook, On Good Manners fo r Boys ([1530] 1985), 
we get a slightly more refined set o f admonitions:
“Turn away when spitting, lest your saliva fall on someone. If  any­
thing purulent falls oii the ground, it should be trodden upon, lest it 
nauseate someone.” (Elias [1939] 2000, 130)
Elias reports the following elaboration on this norm from a 1714 manual 
on civility:
“Do not spit so far that you have to look for the saliva to put your 
foot on it.” (131)
But, according to Elias, already in the seventeenth century the norms 
against spitting are showing signs of much greater restrictions. He writes 
that the next step in the development of spitting norms is exhibited by 
Courtin in 1672, who wrote: “Formerly . . .  it was permitted to spit on
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the ground before people of rank, and was sufficient to put one’s foot on 
the sputum. Today that is an indecency” (130). The emerging norm was 
to spit into a handkerchief, as expressed in a 1729 manual: “When you 
are with well-born people, and when you are in places that are kept clean, 
it is polite to spit into your handkerchief while turning slightly aside” 
(131). Within another 150 years, spitting is more roundly rejected. Elias 
quotes from a nineteenth-century English etiquette manual that briefly 
advises, “Spitting is at all times a disgusting habit. I need say nothing 
more than—never indulge in it” (132).
Elias’ agenda, as noted, is to argue that societal pressures force us to 
have a lower threshold of repugnance. It’s quite possible that this is so. 
However, for present purposes. I’m interested in drawing a less theoreti­
cally burdened lesson from Elias’ review. His review suggests the following 
descriptive claims. First, many activities that are likely to elicit disgust and 
that are now regarded as counternormative in our culture (e.g., spitting 
beside the basin, spitting into a handkerchief, blowing the nose with two 
lingers) were once regarded as permissible in the culture. This, of course, 
fits with broader anthropological findings of cultural differences in eti­
quette norms. More interestingly, Elias’ review suggests that when disgust- 
backed norms became part of the culture’s manners, those norms were, 
by and large, preserved. That is, at least in our culture, normative prohi­
bitions against disgusting actions typically did not go away. Elias reports 
no cases in which disgusting prohibitions are repealed. Rather, new pro­
hibitions against disgusting actions are introduced, and those prohibitions 
were then preserved in the culture.
This trend depicted by Elias fits the hypothesis I'm urging, viz., that 
disgust-norms will fare well since affect facilitates transmission. But one 
might worry that my attempt to exploit Elias' review for my hypothesis is 
thwarted by Elias’ own interpretation of the pattern. For when Elias 
claims that social pressures expand the threshold of disgust, what he is 
saying, effectively, is that the norms come first and the emotions are then 
shaped by the norms. What I want to claim is that the norms succeed in 
part because o f the emotions that are already in place.*1
If emotional responses were entirely malleable, then Elias’ review prob­
ably could not support the hypothesis I’m pushing. But there is no reason 
to think that emotions are that malleable. Even if Elias is right that social 
pressures expand the threshold of disgust, it’s likely that a crucial feature 
here is that the disgust mechanism is at least predisposed to find saliva 
and mucus objectionable. That is, we come prepared to be disgusted by
4. I t’s im portan t to note that it’s possible to  feel disgust for a behavior w ithout re­
garding the behavior as violating norm s. F o r instance, dissecting pig fetuses in high 
school biology classes is not counternorm ative, but m any find it quite disgusting.
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certain things and not others (cf. Seligman 1971; Garcia 1990). As noted 
earlier, disgust is a basic emotion (Ekman 1994; Rozin et al. 2000, 638— 
639), and by common consensus, body products are at the core of the 
eliciting conditions for disgust (Rozin et al. 2000, 647). Indeed, Haidt and 
colleagues maintain that it’s useful to distinguish “core disgust,” which is 
elicited by body products, food, and animals (especially animals associated 
with body products or spoiled food) (Haidt et al. 1994), Similarly, Rozin 
and colleagues write that “Body products are usually a focus of disgust. 
. . . There is widespread historical and cultural evidence for aversion to 
virtually all body products, including feces, vomit, urine, and blood” (Ro­
zin et al. 2000, 640). For present purposes, then, it will be safest to focus 
on core disgust, and even ^omewhat more conservatively, on body prod­
ucts as the important elicitor category for core disgust. Given this more 
conservative notion of disgust, we can now sharpen our hypothesis:
1B. Norms prohibiting j'core-disgusting” actions (i.e., actions that are 
likely to elicit core disgust) will enjoy greater cultural fitness than 
norms prohibiting actions that are unlikely to elicit core disgust 
(or other emotions)
Once the hypothesis is thus sharpened, it largely sidesteps the concern over 
the ductile nature o f human emotion. For core disgust is plausibly a basic 
emotion that has been in the human repertoire for millennia. On this more 
restricted hypothesis, Elias’ review still fits the hypothesis since activities 
like spitting and nose blowing fit squarely in the elicitor category for core 
disgust.
7. Testing the Hypothesis, ^n the previous section I suggested that Elias’ 
review of manners fits  with our hypothesis. But there is a crucial body of 
information that Elias’ review entirely neglects. W hat Elias’ review fails 
to do is to compare the norms that survive with the norms that fall into 
desuetude. In effect, Elias only gives us one dimension, the dimension that 
traces the manners that survive. At a minimum, to evaluate hypothesis B, 
one needs to consider another dimension: the norms that don’t survive. 
And hypothesis B generates a clear prediction: if we look to the manners 
books from our cultural past, we should find that the norms prohibiting 
core-disgusting actions are more likely than the non-affect-backed norms 
to be part of contemporary manners in our culture.
To join this task in a systematic fashion, one needs to examine closely 
the manners at some particular juncture in our culture’s past, and since 
our primary data are etiquette manuals, this means focusing on some par­
ticular manners book. Thus, the first question to answer is which manners 
book to use. I used a simple method—I chose what is likely the most 
important manners book irt history: Erasmus’ On Good Manners for Boys.
This text was enormously popular and influential. There were 130 editions 
of the book. It was first published in Latin (1530), but was quickly trans­
lated into English (1532), and shortly thereafter into French, German, and 
Czech. Erasmus’ treatise also exerted a huge influence over later etiquette 
manuals, many of which simply lifted large portions of Erasmus’ text. In 
addition to its enormous influence, this book was one of the first manners 
books in this tradition to be aimed at the general population rather than 
the members of the court. Finally, this text occupies the central place in 
Elias' review. Elias treats Erasmus’ treatise as the pivotal work in begin­
ning the “civilizing process” (Elias [1939] 2000, 47ff.). So Erasmus pro­
vides an excellent place to join the project.
In fact, Erasmus’ book looks to me to be a remarkable miscellany that 
includes prohibitions that seem completely arbitrary and prohibitions of 
things too obviously repulsive to need mentioning. But I don’t expect that 
my intuitions about this are sufficient to support the theoretical conclu­
sions. After all, I had a very clear agenda in mind when 1 read over Eras­
mus’ text—I hoped to find that the text confirmed my hypothesis. As a 
result, 1 tried to develop this into something a little more methodologically 
reputable. 1 had independent coders who were blind to the hypothesis 
evaluate large portions of Erasmus text, and analyzed the results.
Selection o f  materials. On Good Manners fo r Boys includes hundreds of 
normative proclamations, but to explore the issue of interest, it suffices to 
look at a representative sample. The goal is to explore whether prohibi­
tions against core-disgusting actions are more likely to survive than other 
manners-norms. So I sought out items that were plausibly connected to 
core disgust and included those items and the surrounding items as well. 
Prohibitions against core-disgusting actions appear in several places in On 
Good Manners. To help ensure representative samples, where possible I 
used complete entries for given areas. So, for instance, in the contempo­
rary English translation of On Good Manners for Boys, there is a para­
graph devoted to manners about the nose, two paragraphs about the 
mouth (excluding the teeth, which are treated in a third paragraph), a 
paragraph about “the parts of the body which nature has invested with 
modesty” (277), and two paragraphs on dress. I used all the items from 
these portions of the text. The text also includes a long section on table 
manners, and I included all the items from the first paragraph on table 
manners.
There remains the difficult issue of how to individuate the norms. Re­
lying on etiquette books provides us with a means of individuating norms 
that is at least relatively unbiased. For Erasmus basically presents the 
norms as a list, and we can merely adopt his listing procedure. This is 
exactiy what I did, and, as far as possible I used the items verbatim from 
the English translation. But there was one important complication. For a
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few of Erasmus’ items, it seemed likely that part of the item would fit with 
contemporary manners anti part would not. As a result, I instructed the 
primary coder that if she regarded part of the claim as fitting and part as 
not fitting with contemporary manners, then she was to indicate this. 
There were 5 items coded this way; I reworded three of these items to 
eliminate the conflict and split the other two items into separate claims. 
This resulted in a total of 61 items given to the secondary coder.
Coding, All coders were unaware of the purposes of the study and un­
aware of the source of the items, and all of them worked independently. 
There were two coding processes. One coder determined which items for­
bid something likely to elicit “core disgust,” which items permitted some­
thing likely to elicit core disgust, and which items did not involve anything
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likely to  elicit core disgust, 
elicited by body products
, The coder was instructed that core disgust was 
including especially bodily fluids. Two other 
coders determined whether the normative claim fit or did not fit with con­
temporary manners. For items that did not fit with contemporary man­
ners, the coders had to note whether contemporary manners is neutral 
about the action or forbidp the action. Inter-rater agreement on whether 
the items were part of contemporary manners was high (88%), and the 
statistics were calculated uging the primary coder.
Analysis. Of the 61 items, 44 were coded as not likely to elicit core 
disgust and 17 items were coded as likely to elicit core disgust. For 4 of 
the 17 disgust items, Erasmus maintains that the action is permissible. For 
instance, one of the items was: “If it is impermissible to ground spit under 
foot, catch up the spittle with a cloth.” The two manners-coders main­
tained that all four of the disgusting items that were permitted by Erasmus 
are prohibited by contemporary manners. Subsequent analyses excluded 
these 4 items, leaving 57 items.
To see the statistic of m ist interest for evaluating our hypothesis, it will 
be helpful to consult a table of the raw numbers (Table 1). What we want 
to know is whether the sixtelenth-century norms prohibiting core-disgusting 
actions are more likely td be part of contemporary manners than the 
sixteenth-century norms prohibiting actions unlikely to elicit core disgust. 








Action likely to elicit core 1 12
disgust
Action not likely to elicit 32 12
core disgust
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“Withdraw when you are going to vomit.” (276).
“Reswallowing sp ittle .. 
people of spitting after
“To repress the need 
requires it to be done
s uncouth as is the practice we observe in some 
every third word.” (276).
l o urinate is injurious to health; but propriety 
in private.” (277).
While the norms prohibiting core-disgusting actions have gained in nor­
mative strength, the non-core-disgust norms have often simply disap­
peared from the culture. Of course, it’s also the case that some of the 
etiquette rules that have prevailed have nothing to do with core disgust or 
with any other emotion. For instance, Erasmus tells us th a t “The cup and 
small eating knife, duly cleaned, should be on the right-hand side” (281). 
This remains part of our tradition of etiquette today. But this in no way 
threatens our hypothesis, which is probabilistic, not categorical: norms 
prohibiting actions that elicit negative emotions are more likely to survive 
than affectively neutral norms.5 The evidence from Erasmus looks to pro­
vide impressive confirmation for this hypothesis.
Although I’ve focused on Erasmus’ text for the statistical evaluation, 
similar trends are apparent in etiquette books that were not influenced by 
Erasmus. For instance, in John Russell’s The Boke o f  Nurture ([1460] 
1969), the table settings (which are typically clear cases of manners norms 
that don’t connect with ccjre disgust) differ significantly from contempo­
rary settings (see e.g., lines 200-212); The text also offers the following 
variegated set of prohibitions in quick succession: Don’t twist your neck, 
don’t claw at your crotch . . , ,  don’t pick your ears, don’t be slow to hear, 
don’t retch, don’t spit too far, don’t laugh loudly (lines 285-286,289-290). 
Contemporary manners atfe rather tolerant of twisting one’s neck, being 
slow to hear, and laughing loudly. But contemporary manners continue 
to frown upon groping at one’s crotch, ear picking, retching, and projectile 
spitting.6
8. Harm Norms Revisited, j ’ve argued that a central chunk of our manners 
norms seems to be preserved partly because the norms are connected to 
core disgust. This argument was intended to help confirm the hypothesis 
that norms gain greater cultural fitness when they prohibit actions that 
are likely to elicit negative fleet. Similarly, then it might well be that some 
of our moral norms gained an edge in cultural fitness by prohibiting ac-
5. The probabilistic nature o f  the hypothesis can also accom m odate the fact that som e­
times we develop norm s that run  against ou r em otions.
6. See also the medieval Itali&n and G erm an etiquette verse collected in Furnivall 
(1869), especially da R jva, B arbarino, and the sum mary o f  rules from  T hotnasin 's The 
Italian Quest (Furnivall 1869, Part II, 113-117).
tions that are likely to elicit negative affect. The moral norms that I’ll 
focus on here are the norms against harming others, since those norms 
are plausibly at the heart of our moral outlook and seem to be cross- 
culturally widespread. When we consider our emotional repertoire, I think 
it will seem plausible that our emotional responses helped to secure moral 
norms against harming others.
Witnessing or learning of suffering in others often excites considerable 
affective response in humans. This emotional responsiveness to others’ 
suffering emerges very early in ontogeny. Indeed, emotional responses to 
suffering in others seem to be present in infancy (e.g., Simner 1971); such 
responses are almost certainly cross-culturally universal, and they might 
even be present in some non-human primates (e.g.. Miller et al. 1963). We 
come pre-tuned to be upset by the distress signals of others. And our 
emotional responsiveness to suffering in others is fairly impressive before 
the second birthday. By 18 months or so, children seem to be emotionally 
sensitive not just to distress cues, but to the knowledge that someone else 
is in pain (Nichols 2001).7
I suggest that our emotional sensitivity to suffering in others played an 
important role in securing for harm-norms the central role they occupy in 
our moral outlook. Suffering in others leads to serious negative affect, so 
norms Lhat prohibit harming others would prohibit actions that are likely 
to elicit negative affect. Thus, like the norms against disgusting actions, 
the norms against harmful actions would seem to have increased cultural 
fitness over norms that are not backed by affective response.8 In Section 
2 , 1 reviewed several stories about how harm-norms originated. Whatever 
story one prefers to tell about how the harm-norms were generated in the 
first place, the fact that we are emotionally sensitive to others’ suffering 
helps to explain why the harm-norms ended up being so successful.
9. Implications. The line of argument I’ve been pushing has primarily been 
an attempt to contribute to our understanding of the genealogy of norms. 
However, the apparent role of emotion in the genealogy of norms also 
signals some broad implications for work in cultural evolution. In Sections 
4 and 5, I argued that mental representations that are affectively salient 
would enjoy enhanced cultural fitness. This claim is reinforced by the his­
torical evidence on etiquette norms. Emotion systems seem to play a pow-
7. A lthough the em otional responsiveness to distress in others h asn ’t been widely ac­
cepted as a basic em otion, it does have the features th a i m atter for the epidemiological 
account: i t’s universal and it has a characteristic set o f  eliciting conditions, indeed, some 
o f the eliciting conditions, e.g., crying, seem to  be hardwired.
8. There is also reason to  think th a t the affective response to distress in others plays 
an im portan t role in how individuals actually make m oral judgm ents, but that claim 
require* a separate defense (see e.g., N ichols 2002 an d  forthcom ing).
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erful role in securing whicl 
As a result, epidemiological
mental representations survive in a culture, 
theorists would do well to pay greater atten­
tion to the role of emotion in cultural transmission. For instance, some of 
the most interesting work in the epidemiological tradition has focused on
religious representations (Boyer 1994, 2000), 
But given the potential significance of affect for cultural transmission, a 
deeper understanding of the transmission of religious representations re­
affect in preserving religious representations. 
For, like etiquette norms, religious norms and beliefs plausibly gain in 
cultural fitness as a function of being connected to affective systems.
The role of emotion in cultural transmission also has a rather different 
implication for epidemiological theorists. In keeping with the orientation 
of earlier work in the epidemiological tradition, I have focused on appar­
ently universal features of human affective systems. However, some the­
orists maintain that there is considerable cross-cultural variation in emo­
tion systems. For example, in some cultures anger seems to be elicited and 
displayed in different ways than in other cultures (see Mallon and Stich 
2000 for a useful discussion). If there are such systematic cross-cultural 
differences, they might help epidemiologists explain why some norms and 
ideas are more likely to survive in some cultures than in others. In any 
case, epidemiological approaches to cultural evolution will need to be sen­
sitive to such potential systematic differences in the affective repertoire of 
people in different cultures.
Of course, these implications for the epidemiological approach are only 
crudely sketched. The actual deployment of epidemiological accounts re­
quires careful attention to both the empirical details of emotion systems 
and the historical patterns of cultural representations. But the available 
historical and empirical evidence certainly indicates that the emotions 
played a significant historical role in determining which norms survived 
into the present, and this ejvidence also suggests that an adequate natu­
ralistic account of cultural evolution must begin to accommodate the role 
of affect in cultural transmission.
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